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Abstract This article examines the effect of state ownership on the labor cost stickiness of firms in 22
European countries. States are more likely to interfere in the decision-making processes of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and demand firm activities that are desirable from a socio-political perspective. For
example, to win political support, politicians may instruct SOEs to avoid layoffs to minimize unemployment
rates. The varied objectives of SOEs also make it more difficult to control managers’ behavior, leaving more
room for managerial discretion and the pursuit of self-interests through empire-building behavior. Both state
intervention and managerial self-interest restrain managers from laying off employees or reducing employee
wages when sales decrease, which may lead to greater labor cost stickiness. Data from 1993 to 2012 reveal
that SOEs exhibit greater labor cost stickiness than private firms, and their labor cost stickiness also varies
predictably with socio-political variables such as election years and left-wing governments.
1. Introduction
This study focuses on the differences in labor cost stickiness between state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), which are fully or partially owned by a government (Gupta, 2005; Megginson, 2005;
Wang & Yung, 2011), and private firms. Increased pressures to pursue socio-political objec-
tives and the difficulties involved in controlling managers, due to the wider range of objectives
they confront, cause SOEs to operate less efficiently. Consequently, we predict, and find, that
SOEs exhibit greater labor cost stickiness than private firms. Moreover, we predict that mem-
bership in strategic industries, election years, and left-wing governments increase SOEs’ labor
cost stickiness. Finally, firms are predicted to show less labor cost stickiness in the year prior
to privatization. Using a data set that spans 22 European countries and 40,418 observations for
1993–2012, we document that except for membership in strategic industries these socio-political
factors affect the degree of cost stickiness.
Cost stickiness exists if costs increase more when the level of activity rises than they
decrease when this activity level falls (e.g. Anderson, Banker, & Janakiraman, 2003; Banker,
Byzalov, & Chen, 2013; Chen, Lu, & Sougiannis, 2012). It arises from managers’ resource
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adjustment decisions. When activity levels increase, managers add resources to meet growing
demand; when activity levels fall, they retain their underutilized resources, because they per-
ceive the costs of reducing the resources as higher than the costs of holding them (Anderson
et al., 2003).
Notwithstanding widespread privatization in recent decades, states still own shares in many
firms, and SOEs remain an important component of European countries’ economies (e.g. Chris-
tiansen, 2011; Megginson, 2005). In our sample for example, SOEs account for about 12.62%
and 17.60% of total employees and total revenues, respectively. Many SOEs also dominate
strategic industries (e.g. utilities, electricity, mining, and defense), which enhances their impor-
tance for countries’ economies. The importance of SOEs in turn has generated a considerable
stream of literature about the effects of state ownership on firm performance and firm behavior
(e.g. Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, & Cosset, 2012; Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; D’Souza & Meggin-
son, 1999; Gupta, 2005). However, a research area that remains unexplored is the effect of
state ownership on cost behavior, even though financial performance is strongly influenced by
cost behavior.
In this sense, a key feature of SOEs is that the state can interfere in their decision-making pro-
cesses and operations. This direct influence enables governments or politicians to leverage SOEs
to realize their broader goals, such as social objectives, or to secure their own political interests
(Megginson, 2005; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). It follows that profit maximization
is not SOEs’ sole objective; rather, they have multiple objectives and must weigh different inter-
ests. It is thus unclear how SOEs’ overall performance should be measured, which in turn makes
monitoring SOE managers very complex, such that these managers may have an easier time pur-
suing their own self-interests (Bai, Li, Tao, & Wang, 2000; Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 1994) and
building empires (Chen et al., 2012). Accordingly, SOEs are likely to operate less efficiently than
private firms (Boardman & Vining, 1989; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001). For example, SOEs are
less inclined to lay off employees or reduce employee wages when sales decrease, which leads to
greater cost stickiness. We focus on differences in labor cost stickiness, because prior literature
indicates that decision-makers in SOEs concentrate particularly on labor-related issues, such as
employment and wage levels (e.g. Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1994).
In so doing, we offer several contributions to prior literature. First, we contribute to cost stick-
iness literature by examining SOEs’ cost behavior in 22 European countries. Although Bu, Wen,
and Banker (2015) have analyzed the effect of state ownership on cost stickiness, their study
is limited to China, with its unique institutional features.1 Our cross-country data enable us to
incorporate the effects of country-level variables, which is relevant because SOE behavior relates
closely to country-level socio-political and institutional characteristics. Governments have incen-
tives to exploit their ownership of SOE shares for socio-political interests, and these incentives
vary with factors such as election years and government political orientation. By including these
socio-political variables to explain the cost stickiness of SOEs, we provide new insight into
SOEs’ cost management practices. Second, we contribute to emerging literature on the impact of
state interference on firm behaviors and outcomes, such as the firm’s performance (e.g. Boubakri
& Cosset, 1998; D’Souza & Megginson, 1999; Gupta, 2005; Megginson, Nash, & van Randen-
borgh, 1994), the cost of capital (e.g. Ben-Nasr et al., 2012), or risk-taking behavior (Boubakri,
Cosset, & Saffar, 2013). By studying the impact of state ownership on cost stickiness, we con-
tribute to a clearer understanding of how state interference affects firms’ cost behavior. Our
1We develop our hypotheses independently from Bu et al. (2015).
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findings suggest that performance differences between SOEs and private firms (e.g. Boardman
& Vining, 1989; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001) can be attributed, at least partly, to differences in
resource adjustment decisions.
2. Hypotheses Development
2.1. Determinants of Cost Stickiness
Cost stickiness has been documented in various countries and for various cost categories (Banker,
Byzalov, & Chen, 2013; Banker, Byzalov, & Threinen, 2013; Calleja, Steliaros, & Thomas,
2006; Dierynck, Landsman, & Renders, 2012). Explanations for this phenomenon usually rely
on resource adjustment costs: A firm incurs costs when it disposes of resources and then has to
reacquire those resources after activities return to their previous levels (Anderson et al., 2003;
Banker, Byzalov, & Chen, 2013; Banker, Byzalov, & Threinen, 2013). For example, firms pro-
vide severance payments to lay off employees when sales decline, then must spend time and
costs to recruit and train new employees when sales increase again. When sales decline, remov-
ing unutilized resources with high adjustment costs might be more costly than retaining them, so
resources with high adjustment costs justify greater cost stickiness (Anderson et al., 2003). It is
also likely that cost stickiness is influenced by managerial self-interest. For example, managers
refuse to lay off employees because doing so would be in direct conflict with their desire to build
an empire (Chen et al., 2012), because they fear losing status, or because they are unwilling to
deal with the challenge of negotiating with angry employees (Anderson et al., 2003). The firm’s
governance structure also influences cost stickiness; it incentivizes managers to make certain
decisions that affect cost behavior. For example, better corporate governance reduces cost stick-
iness by restraining managers’ empire-building behavior (Chen et al., 2012). Similarly, firms in
countries that better protect shareholders tend to exhibit less cost stickiness (Banker, Byzalov, &
Threinen, 2013; Calleja et al., 2006).
2.2. State Ownership and Cost Stickiness
Different ownership types provide different incentives for owners to invest in cost-controlling
activities, because ownership type dictates how the benefits of those activities accrue to owners
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Shleifer, 1998), resulting in different cost behav-
iors of firms with different owners (Hall, 2016; Holzhacker, Krishnan, & Mahlendorf, 2015).
Unlike other owners, states have socio-political interests. It is thus likely that SOEs pursue
broader social objectives than private firms do, such as employing a large number of people
to reduce unemployment rates (Bai et al., 2000; Megginson, 2005). Political self-interest also
encourages politicians to intervene in SOEs’ activities, which may, for example, lead to a trans-
fer of wealth to voters at the expense of the firm. Through their political control over SOEs,
politicians can instruct these firms to incur more labor costs (e.g. excess wages, maintaining
employment levels) in an effort to win political support (Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer, 1998;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Such socio-political objectives could conflict with other interests, such
as those of shareholders, if they undermine the firm’s financial performance or shareholder value
maximization. Prior studies accordingly document detrimental effects of political intervention
on SOEs’ financial performance (e.g. Micco, Panizza, & Yanez, 2007; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1994).
The inclusion of socio-political objectives also makes the goals of SOEs more diverse than
those of private firms. Measuring progress against business objectives is generally a challenging
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task; it is especially difficult in relation to socio-political objectives (Bai et al., 2000; Sapienza,
2004; Tirole, 1994). Further complicating the performance measurement efforts in SOEs is the
inherent difficulty of determining the relative importance of various objectives. For example,
what is more important, hiring employees or financial performance? Because overall SOE per-
formance is so difficult to measure, the shareholders’ task of monitoring SOE managers’ behavior
effectively becomes particularly complex, and the space for managerial discretion expands (Bai
et al., 2000; Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 1994). Therefore, SOE managers can more easily pur-
sue their own self-interests and use SOE socio-political objectives as an excuse for their own
underperformance.
We thus predict that SOEs exhibit greater cost stickiness than private firms. First, politi-
cians may use the state’s ownership to instruct SOE managers not to reduce labor resources
(e.g. employee layoffs, wage reduction) even if sales decrease, which would maintain the cur-
rent employment levels and, subsequently, help the politicians win votes (Boycko et al., 1996;
Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Private firms have no need to take such socio-political
considerations into account in their labor resource adjustment decisions, so their decisions should
be less asymmetric. Second, SOE managers are less likely to reduce their labor resources dur-
ing a sales decline, in support of their own interests or to avoid having to make difficult layoff
decisions (Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2012), because they can use SOE socio-political
objectives as decision rationales. In this context, the state, as a shareholder, would have a
hard time disciplining this behavior, because of the difficulty of measuring overall SOE per-
formance (Bai et al., 2000; Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 1994). Measuring performance is more
straightforward in private firms, because their primary objective is profit maximization. The
focus on financial performance measures makes it easier for shareholders of private firms to
discipline firm managers that fail to meet profit maximization goals. Accordingly, our first
hypothesis is
H1: SOEs exhibit greater labor cost stickiness than private firms.
2.3. Labor Cost Stickiness in SOEs and Socio-Political Variables
Next, we turn to the question of why such cost behavior typically is associated with SOEs. A
key assumption of SOE/privatization literature is that SOEs’ behaviors and outcomes depend
on various governance and socio-political factors (e.g. Ben-Nasr et al., 2012; Boubakri et al.,
2013). Governments exert influence on societies in general, so socio-political variables likely
affect private firms’ behaviors too. Yet compared with SOEs, private firms should be less sub-
ject to government interventions, in that the costs of intervening in private firms are much
higher than those for influencing SOEs (Sappington & Stiglitz, 1987). Accordingly, we argue
that the effect of socio-political variables on cost stickiness is stronger for SOEs than for
private firms.
Our first variable of interest refers to the industry in which the SOE operates. Firms in strate-
gic industries such as utilities, electricity, mining, and defense likely have greater labor cost
stickiness, because they typically are more technology-intensive than are non-strategic industries
(Soete, 1991). Consequently, firms in strategic industries tend to rely more on skilled employ-
ees that incur higher adjustment costs, which eventually leads to greater cost stickiness (Banker,
Byzalov, & Chen, 2013). However, the effect of strategic industries on labor cost stickiness is
likely to be stronger for SOEs. As suggested by Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2009), belong-
ing to strategic industries puts SOEs under more public scrutiny and more intense government
intervention. This greater socio-political pressure likely increases the labor cost stickiness of
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SOEs, because SOE managers are more reluctant to adjust labor costs downward when sales
decline. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H2a: The effect of strategic industries on labor cost stickiness is stronger in SOEs than in private firms.
Election years affect the behavior of ruling governments (Besley & Burgess, 2002). Mechtel
and Potrafke (2013) show that ruling governments promote labor-friendly policies to win elec-
toral support. Such labor policies likely increase labor cost stickiness for both SOEs and private
firms, because they make it more difficult for both types of firms to reduce their labor force or
compensation when sales decline.
The effect of election years on labor cost stickiness is likely stronger in SOEs, because private
firms are better able to resist labor-friendly policies (Kleiner, 2001), whereas SOEs have fewer
options to do so. This argument is in line with research into the political role of SOEs during
election years. For example, election years significantly increase state-owned banks’ lending in
emerging countries, apparently to improve the electoral results for the ruling politicians (Dinc,
2005). This approach increases state-owned banks’ underperformance problem (Micco et al.,
2007). In an attempt to avoid popular discontent during election years, politicians likely instruct
SOE managers not to lay off employees or cut their wages when sales decline. Therefore, we
predict that election years amplify the labor cost stickiness of SOEs and hypothesize:
H2b: The effect of election years on labor cost stickiness is stronger in SOEs than in private firms.
In addition, left-wing governments tend to pursue more labor-friendly policies, whereas right-
wing ones are more market-oriented (Hibbs, 1977). Left-wing governments are thus associated
with lower unemployment rates (Hibbs, 1977) and higher minimum wages (Saint-Paul, Bean,
& Bertola, 1996), which implies greater cost stickiness for all firms due to the labor-friendly
policies. Nevertheless, the effect of left-wing governments on labor cost stickiness should be
more evident in SOEs, because these governments tend to use their SOEs as a tool to achieve
broader political goals (Avsar, Karayalcin, & Ulubasoglu, 2013), such that SOEs are subject to
more intense intervention. For example, to support their political agenda, left-wing governments
likely instruct SOEs not to fire employees or reduce their compensation even when sales decline.
In this situation, SOEs will be slower to scale down their labor costs. Private firms are more
capable of resisting labor-friendly policies (Kleiner, 2001), so we predict that the effect of left-
wing governments on labor cost stickiness is more pronounced for SOEs than for private firms.
This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:
H2c: The effect of left-wing governments on labor cost stickiness is stronger in SOEs than in private firms.
The last variable of interest is the privatization year. Prior to privatization, states tend to cut costs
aggressively to improve SOEs’ performance and thereby maximize the proceeds from selling
their shares (Megginson, 2005). This aggressive cost-cutting likely causes a decrease in cost
stickiness in the year prior to privatization. Using this argument, we posit:
H2d: In the year prior to the privatization, privatized firms exhibit less labor cost stickiness than in other pre-
privatization years.
During and after privatization, performance generally improves, because the level of private
ownership increases, and firms experience increased performance pressures (e.g. Boubakri &
Cosset, 1998; D’Souza & Megginson, 1999; Gupta, 2005; Megginson et al., 1994). These pres-
sures arguably reduce labor cost stickiness further. However, as indicated by Banker and Fang
(2013) in a loan financing setting, it can also be argued that during and after privatization, the
incentives to improve performance through aggressive cost-cutting may decrease, because the
government has accomplished its objective. In a similar vein, labor costs may be stickier than
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they were before, because privatized firms need to restructure their labor forces to meet new
private owners’ demands or to address the aftermath of unsustainable pre-privatization cost-




We use annual data from Datastream on European nonfinancial listed firms for the years 1993–
2012. We start our sample period in 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty went into effect. The
Treaty requires member states to keep their budget deficit below 3% of total gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) and their sovereign debt at no more than 60% of total GDP. These budget requirements
created an impetus for member countries to privatize their SOEs.
To obtain privatization data, we identify all nonfinancial firms covered by the Privatization
Barometer and check whether they appear in Datastream. The Privatization Barometer database
contains information about privatizations in European countries (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mat-
tei, 2013); it informs prior research into privatizations in the European Union (e.g. Borisova,
Brockman, Salas, & Zagorchev, 2012; Boubakri et al., 2009). The Privatization Barometer also
provides data about state ownership and privatization years. Similar to Borisova et al. (2012),
we define direct state ownership to include ownership by non-central government entities (e.g.
provincial or municipal governments) and entities established specifically to manage the central
government’s funds.2 To ensure the accuracy and validity of our data, we gather information
about the firms’ state shareholders from annual reports and websites. The verification procedure
spans all available annual reports of all firms. If there is no information about firm shareholders,
we rely on the Privatization Barometer data.
Following Anderson et al. (2003) and Banker, Byzalov, and Chen (2013), we delete firm-year
data that contain missing, zero, or negative values for revenues, labor costs in the current year or
the two prior years, or current total assets. We also discard firm-year data if LaborCostst > Salest
or LaborCostst−1 > Salest−1, where LaborCosts refers to a firm’s total labor costs. Observations
in which the sales increase is greater than 50% or the decrease is more than 33% are excluded too,
because such large changes likely indicate mergers and divestitures (Banker, Byzalov, & Chen,
2013). Furthermore, we screen for missing data about state ownership and require that firms use
the same reporting currencies for the current year and two prior years. Finally, we delete the 1%
outliers for each tail of labor cost change and revenue change. Thus the final sample includes
40,418 firm-year observations of 5931 unique firms, including 1208 observations (148 unique
firms) involving state ownership.3
3.2. Model Specification and Variable Measurement
To operationalize labor costs, we use the Salaries and Benefit Expenses item in Datastream,
which represents all wages and other benefits assigned to employees and officers. Following
2Some countries establish special entities to perform activities on behalf of the state, such as those that invest state funds
in other firms to generate returns for the states (e.g., Solidium in Finland, Parpublica in Portugal). Other entities serve
non-economic purposes, such as the CEA (Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et aux énergies alternatives), established
to facilitate France’s nuclear development.
3Because we obtain the SOE sample from the Privatization Barometer and Datastream, our sample generally excludes
SOEs that are wholly owned by the state.
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Anderson et al. (2003) and Chen et al. (2012), we employ the following model to test H1:
lnLaborCosti,t = β0 + β1 · lnSalesi,t + β2 · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β3
· SOEi,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β4 · AsInti,t · Deci,t
· lnSalesi,t + β5 · SucDeci,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β6
· EPLi,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β7 · CommonLawi,t · Deci,t
· lnSalesi,t + β8 · Growthi,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t
+ ·γ · Standalone Variablesi,t + εi,t,
(1)
where LaborCost and Sales are deflated total labor costs and net sales, respectively, and the
subscripts i and t refer to firm i and year t, respectively. In addition, Dec is a dummy vari-
able that equals 1 if sales decrease in the current year and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable
SOE equals 1 if the government owns some percentage of the firm’s shares and 0 otherwise.
γ ·StandaloneVariables is written in vector form and refers to the main variable SOE and to
the control variables included in the interaction terms in equation (1) (AsInt, SucDec, EPL,
etc.). To facilitate our interpretation of the results, we mean-center all the continuous vari-
ables in the interaction terms (Aiken & West, 1991). Consistent with prior research (Anderson
et al., 2003; Dierynck et al., 2012), costs are sticky when β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. To confirm
H1, which predicts that SOEs exhibit greater cost stickiness than private firms, we would
require β3 < 0.
Following prior studies (Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2012), we include two firm-level
control variables in our analysis. First, we include asset intensity (AsInt), which is the total
assets divided by net sales. Second, we control for successive decrease (SucDec), which is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if Salesi,t < Salesi,t−1 < Salesi,t−2, and 0 otherwise (Dierynck
et al., 2012).4
As country-level control variables, we include the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
strictness index (EPL), legal origin (CommonLaw), and GDP growth (Growth). The EPL strict-
ness index from the OECD measures the strictness of labor regulations with regard to employee
dismissals; a higher value indicates stricter labor laws, which should be associated with higher fir-
ing costs and thus greater cost stickiness (Banker, Byzalov, & Chen, 2013).5 The dummy variable
CommonLaw equals 1 for common-law countries and 0 otherwise (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanez,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). The effects of legal origin on cost stickiness are unclear: common-law
countries are more shareholder-oriented (Calleja et al., 2006), but they also facilitate long-term
resource commitments (Banker, Byzalov, & Chen, 2013; Banker, Byzalov, & Threinen, 2013).
Finally, GDP growth (Growth), obtained from the World Bank, represents macroeconomic con-
ditions in individual countries that may affect managerial optimism about the prospects for future
sales (Anderson et al., 2003).
4Following Banker et al. (2013a, 2013b), we do not include employee intensity. This variable, measured by dividing
total employees (non-financial data) by total sales (financial data) potentially leads to distorted results in cross-country
research, due to the currency differences across countries.
5We use the unweighted average strictness of employment protections for regular and temporary workers. We had to
exclude Cypriot, Lithuanian, and Maltese firms, because these countries do not appear in the OECD EPL Strictness
database.
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To test H2a–c, we split our observations into SOE and private firm subsamples and mod-
ify Equation (1) by omitting the SOE and SOE·Dec·lnSales variables while adding the
socio-political variables (and their interactions with Dec·lnSales), to produce the following
equation:
lnLaborCosti,t = β0 + β1 · lnSalesi,t + β2 · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β
· SocPolVari,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β4 · AsInti,t · Deci,t
· lnSalesi,t + β5 · SucDeci,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β6
· EPLi,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β7 · CommonLawi,t · Deci,t
· lnSalesi,t + β8 · Growthi,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t
+ γ · Standalone Variablesi,t + εi,t,
(2)
where SocPolVar refers to the socio-political variables of interest (i.e. StratInd, ElecYear, or Left-
Wing, as we discuss subsequently). γ ·StandaloneVariables is written in vector form and refers to
the main variables StratInd, ElecYear, and Leftwing, and to the control variables included in the
interaction terms in Equation (2) (AsInt, SucDec, EPL, etc.).
In H2a, we predict that the coefficient on StratInd·Dec·lnSales (β9) is more negative in the
SOE subsample than in the private firms subsample.6 We follow Boubakri et al. (2009) and
include mining, steel, transportation, utilities, defense, telecommunications, and oil as strategic
industries. The dummy variable StratInd equals 1 if the firm operates in a strategic industry and
0 otherwise.
To test H2b, similar to Dinc (2005), we obtain election year data from the Europe World Year
Book. For post-2006 data, we use the International Foundation for Electoral Systems’ (2014)
Election Guide website. The dummy variable ElecYear equals 1 if the year considered is an
election year and 0 otherwise. To test H2c, similar to Ben-Nasr et al. (2012), we use annual
data provided by the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff,
Keefer, & Walsh, 2001; Keefer, 2014) to obtain information about the political orientation of
the ruling party. We construct a dummy variable (LeftWing) that equals 1 if the ruling govern-
ment is left-wing and 0 otherwise. Similar to H2a, H2b–H2c predict that the coefficients on
ElecYear·Dec·lnSales (β10) and LeftWing·Dec·lnSales (β11) are more negative in the SOE
subsample than in the private firm subsample.
Our last socio-political variable is privatization. To test H2d, we construct several dummy
variables. That is, PrePriv1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the year prior to the privatiza-
tion year and 0 otherwise. To compare PrePriv1 with earlier pre-privatization years, we control
for the effects of the privatization and post-privatization years by developing three dummy vari-
ables: PrivYear, PostPriv. PrivYear equals 1 for years in which the government sold shares of
a particular SOE and 0 otherwise; PostPrivequals 1 if the observation takes place after a pri-
vatization year and 0 otherwise.7 We estimate this model only for the SOE subsample, while
using the earlier pre-privatization years as the baseline group. Support for H2d would require
6Cost stickiness corresponds to a negative number, so a more negative interaction coefficient represents greater cost
stickiness.
7Alternatively, we develop two dummy variables that equal one if the observation takes place 1-5 (6 or more) years
after a privatization year and 0 otherwise in order to control for a privatization year’s short term and long term effects
separately. This alternative analysis generate qualitatively similar results.
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the coefficient β12 of PrePriv1·Dec·lnSales to be positive. Specifically, we use Equation (3) to
test H2d:
lnLaborCosti,t = β0 + β1 · lnSalesi,t + β2 · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β12
· PrePriv1i,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β13 · PrivYeari,t · Deci,t
· lnSalesi,t + β14 · PostPrevi,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β4;
· AsInti,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β5 · SucDeci,t · Deci,t
· lnSalesi,t + β6 · EPLi,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β7
· CommonLawi,t · Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + β8 · Growthi,t
· Deci,t · lnSalesi,t + · γ · Standalone Variablesi,t + εi,t,
(3)
where γ ·StandaloneVariables is witten in vector form and refers to the main variable PrePriv1
and to the control variables included in the interaction terms in equation (3) (PrivYear, PostPriv,
AsInt, SucDec, EPL, etc.). In all models, we also include industry dummy variables, using the
Fama-French (2016) 49 industries classification, to control for industry effects on firms’ cost
behavior. Finally, we add fiscal-year dummy variables to control for possible year effects. The
appendix contains the variable definitions.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
In the overall sample, labor costs constitute 26.55% of total sales. In 37.34% of our observations,
we find a sales decline in the current year, while 18.31% experience successive sales decreases.
Panel A of Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for each country.
In Panel B of Table 1, we divide the sample into SOEs and private firms. The SOEs expe-
rienced relatively fewer sales declines (Dec and SucDec); they also have more employees than
private firms on average. At a 5% significance level, SOEs and private firms differ significantly
only for one socio-political variable (StratInd). Most of the SOE observations do not relate to
privatization years. Untabulated data indicate that the average percentage of government own-
ership in SOEs is relatively high (43.08%). Our data contain 206 firm-year observations with
privatizations (48 that completely eliminate government ownership). On average, privatization
reduces government ownership by 24.47%.
Table 2 contains the results of the Pearson and Spearman correlation tests of the associations
among the main variables.
4.2. Main Results
Table 3 shows the results of the regressions for H1.8 The first column in Table 3 only includes
firm-level variables and affirms that our sample firms exhibit sticky cost behavior, with a sig-
nificantly positive value of β1(0.673, t = 69.84) and a significantly negative coefficient for
Dec·lnSales (β2 = − 0.277, t = − 16.90). On average, labor costs rise by 0.673% for each
1% increase in net sales, but they diminish by only 0.396% (0.673%–0.277%) for each 1%
decrease in net sales. The positive value of SucDec·Dec·lnSales and the negative value of the
8Consistent with Chen et al. (2012) and Dierynck et al. (2012), we use firm-level clustered standard errors to control for





Table 1. Descriptive statistics.



















Austria 776 0.254 1.455 0.361 0.161 5128 2.019 2.205 126 (0.162)
Belgium 905 0.225 14.479 0.399 0.180 7241 1.749 2.709 21 (0.023)
Czech Republic 317 0.118 1.568 0.492 0.284 3954 2.756 2.354 46 (0.145)
Denmark 1439 0.276 1.593 0.347 0.161 5223 1.484 2.042 24 (0.017)
Estonia 25 0.161 1.354 0.280 0.120 2435 0.812 2.231 1 (0.040)
Finland 1217 0.276 0.950 0.339 0.149 5514 2.396 2.021 128 (0.105)
France 6676 0.290 1.213 0.364 0.187 13,142 1.402 3.291 180 (0.027)
Germany 5834 0.281 1.028 0.388 0.201 13,666 1.374 2.260 134 (0.023)
Greece 826 0.191 1.857 0.496 0.298 1723 − 1.157 2.911 49 (0.059)
Hungary 267 0.157 1.112 0.494 0.281 3537 2.290 2.099 39 (0.146)
Ireland 438 0.212 1.696 0.342 0.169 3241 4.338 1.402 10 (0.023)
Italy 2206 0.220 1.785 0.398 0.204 6974 0.573 2.870 172 (0.078)
Luxembourg 130 0.194 2.077 0.415 0.177 8808 2.772 3.284 0 (0)
Latvia 12 0.191 1.700 1.000 0.417 406 4.35 2.240 0 (0)
Netherlands 1372 0.271 0.843 0.382 0.188 17,645 2.146 2.030 29 (0.021)
Poland 878 0.175 1.146 0.319 0.117 3353 4.449 2.362 78 (0.089)
Portugal 604 0.195 1.920 0.425 0.238 5144 1.435 2.850 47 (0.078)
Slovenia 128 0.204 1.750 0.414 0.180 3041 − 0.214 2.593 7 (0.055)
Slovakia 69 0.172 1.181 0.478 0.246 2433 5.259 2.391 11 (0.159)
Spain 1249 0.213 1.851 0.352 0.172 10,552 2.067 3.005 68 (0.054)
Sweden 2191 0.322 1.014 0.361 0.156 7348 2.477 1.655 24 (0.011)
UK 12,859 0.274 1.222 0.363 0.172 8059 2.364 1.078 14 (0.001)
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of selected variables, SOEs vs. Private firms




/Employees PrivYear StratInd ElecYear LeftWing
SOE 1208 1.822 0.324 0.143 39,390 0.211 227.76 0.131 0.729 0.268 0.416
Private 39,210 1.550 0.375 0.184 8449 0.267 112.54 n.a 0.121 0.245 0.432
Difference
test
(p-value) 0.785 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a 0.000 0.067 0.246
Total 40,418 1.558 0.373 0.183 9379 0.266 116.01 0.150 0.246 0.432
Notes: For panel B, all statistics are proportional values except for AsInt, Employees, Labor Costs/ Sales, and Labor Costs/ Employees (mean values). Numbers in bold in the row









Table 2. Correlation matrix.
LaborCosts/
Sales SOE AsInt Dec SucDec Employees EPL CommonLaw Growth
LaborCosts/Sales − 0.057*** 0.109*** 0.061*** 0.063*** − 0.122*** − 0.061*** 0.039*** − 0.056***
SOE − 0.061*** 0.139*** − 0.018*** − 0.018*** 0.186*** 0.091*** − 0.115*** − 0.004
AsInt 0.002 0.001 0.035*** 0.020*** 0.007 0.159*** − 0.091*** − 0.097***
Dec 0.056*** − 0.018*** 0.000 0.613*** − 0.061*** 0.015*** − 0.016*** − 0.152***
SucDec 0.056*** − 0.018*** − 0.004 0.613*** − 0.050*** 0.027*** − 0.20*** − 0.087***
Employees − 0.039*** 0.160*** − 0.003 − 0.021*** − 0.018*** 0.034*** − 0.042*** 0.012**
EPL − 0.046*** 0.096*** 0.009 0.015*** 0.026*** 0.038*** − 0.831*** − 0.271***
CommonLaw 0.029*** − 0.115*** − 0.007 − 0.016*** − 0.020*** − 0.032*** − 0.843*** 0.219***
Growth − 0.052*** − 0.001 − 0.000 − 0.175*** − 0.095*** − 0.024*** − 0.197*** 0.161***
Notes: The numbers below the diagonal represent the Pearson correlation coefficients; the numbers above the diagonal are the Spearman correlations coefficients.
*Significance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
**Significance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
***Significance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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Table 3. Results of regression analyses: Hypothesis 1.
Dependent variable: ΔlnLaborCost
Independent variables Predicted sign (1) (2) (3)
lnSales (β1) + 0.673 0.672 0.667
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]***
Dec·lnSales (β2) − − 0.277 − 0.270 − 0.271
[0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.020]***
SOE·Dec·lnSales (β3) − − 0.194 − 0.174
[0.056]*** [0.057]***
AsInt·Dec·lnSales (β4) − − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.002
[0.001]* [0.001]* [0.001]*
Suc·Dec·lnSales (β5) + 0.138 0.135 0.139
[0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.021]***
EPL·Dec·lnSales (β6) − − 0.035
[0.020]*
CommonLaw·Dec·lnSales (β7) ? 0.020
[0.036]
Growth·Dec·lnSales (β8) − 0.008
[0.003]**
SOE − 0.021 − 0.019
[0.004]*** [0.004]***
AsInt − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***










R2 0.43 0.43 0.43
N 40,418 40,418 40,418
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression analyses to investigate the degree of cost stickiness of SOEs.
The dependent variable is lnLaborCost (change of the natural logarithmic value of labor costs). Column 1 does not
include the SOE variable and its interaction term. Column 2 includes the SOE variable and its interaction term. Column
3 includes country-level control variables. Figures in brackets are standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The degree
of cost stickiness of SOEs is in bold figures. See the appendix for variable definitions.
*Significance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
**Significance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
***Significance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
AsInt·Dec·lnSales are in line with previous literature (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al.,
2012; Dierynck et al., 2012).
For the test of H1, in column 2 of Table 3, we introduce the SOE dummy variable to the
regression equation.9 The empirical results support H1, in that we find a significantly nega-
tive coefficient for SOE·Dec·lnSales (β3 = − 0.194, t = − 3.44). On average, SOEs exhibit
a higher level of labor cost stickiness than private firms.
Next, we include country-level controls in the regression model. As column 3 in Table 3
shows, the coefficient of SOE·Dec·lnSales remains significantly negative (β3 = − 0.174,
9Including two-way interaction terms in the regression specifications leads to severe multicollinearity problems for
lnSalesi ,t and Deci ,t.lnSalesi ,t when we include country-level variables. Therefore, consistent with prior studies of
cost stickiness (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2012), we do not use these terms in our specifications.
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t = − 3.07), confirming the greater cost stickiness of SOEs compared with private firms. Con-
sistent with Banker, Byzalov, & Chen (2013), the labor costs of firms from countries with higher
EPL scores are stickier (i.e. significantly negative β6). For CommonLaw·Dec·lnSales (β7), we
find insignificant results. The coefficient of Growth·Dec·lnSales (β8) is significantly positive,
such that firms from countries with higher GDP growth have less sticky costs. Taken together,
these results indicate that, even after controlling for country-level factors, SOEs exhibit greater
cost stickiness than private firms.
Turning to H2a, columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 reveal that the coefficient β9 on
StratInd·Dec·lnSales is more negative in the SOE subsample than in the private firm subsam-
ple (β9,SOE = − 0.201; β9,Privatefirms = − 0.166). The Chow test indicates that the coefficient on
StratInd·Dec·lnSales (β9) in the SOE subsample is not significantly stronger than the coef-
ficient in the private firm subsample (F = .65, p = .421). These findings do not support H2a
and imply that operating in strategic industries does not increase labor cost stickiness to a
significantly greater extent in SOEs than in private firms.
Columns 3 (SOE) and 4 (private firms) of Table 4 further show that election years have sig-
nificantly positive effects on labor cost stickiness only in the SOE subsample, as signaled by the
negative coefficient of ElecYear·Dec·lnSales (β10 = − 0.301, t = − 2.24). This effect is not
significant in the private firm subsample. The Chow test indicates that the effect of ElecYear on
cost stickiness in the SOE subsample is significantly stronger than in the private firm subsample
(F = 11.23, p = .00). These results are consistent with H2b and suggest that states increase their
interference with SOEs’ labor cost adjustment decisions in election years.
According to column 5 in Table 4, left-wing governments have a significantly positive effect
on SOEs’ cost stickiness (β11 = − 0.349, t = 2.68), while column 6 does not indicate a signifi-
cant effect for private firms. A Chow test shows that the coefficient of LeftWing·Dec·lnSales in
the SOE subsample is significantly more negative than in the private firm subsample (F = 15.95,
p = .00). These results support H2c; left-wing governments’ labor-friendly policies cause SOEs
to reduce their labor costs less when sales decline.
Finally, column 7 of Table 4 presents a significantly positive coefficient for PrePriv1·Dec·
lnSales (β12 = 0.340, t = 1.71). Relative to earlier pre-privatization years, labor cost sticki-
ness is significantly lower in the year prior to the privatization year. Column 7 also reveals that,
starting with the privatization year, privatized firms exhibit labor cost behavior that is similar to
earlier pre-privatization years. These results provide support for H2d and suggest that states tend
to restructure their labor force and cut costs rather aggressively in the year prior to privatization.
Overall, these results largely support our predictions that socio-political variables affect the
labor cost stickiness of SOEs.
4.3. Cost Stickiness of SOEs and Political Connections
Even as we show that SOEs exhibit greater cost stickiness than private firms, SOEs might not
differ substantively from private firms with political connections to a country’s top officials, such
as when (persons related to) politicians are board members or large shareholders of a private firm
(Faccio, 2006). Private firms may obtain political benefits from such connections; it is also pos-
sible that states exert political influences on these firms through these connections. For example,
politicians may require such firms to delay labor reductions during economic recessions to main-
tain their popular vote (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2006). Consequently, states can
pursue their socio-political interests through both their ownership of firms and their influences
on politically connected firms. In terms of cost stickiness, firms’ political connections may pro-






Table 4. Results of regression analyses: Hypotheses 2a–d.
Dependent variable: lnLaborCost
Test of H2a Test of H2b Test of H2c Test of H2d
Predicted Sign SOEs Private firms SOEs Private firms SOEs Private firms SOEs
lnSales (β1) + 0.504 0.672 0.507 0.671 0.504 0.671 0.507
[0.053]*** [0.010]*** [0.053]*** [0.010]*** [0.053]*** [0.010]*** [0.053]***
Dec·lnSales (β2) − − 0.083 − 0.257 − 0.151 − 0.271 − 0.061 − 0.285 − 0.203
[0.130] [0.021]*** [0.100] [0.022]*** [0.113] [0.022]*** [0.116]*
AsInt·Dec·lnSales (β4) − 0.042 − 0.002 0.007 − 0.002 0.016 − 0.002 0.019
[0.053] [0.001]* [0.050] [0.001]* [0.051] [0.001]* [0.051]
SucDec·Dec·lnSales (β5) + 0.144 0.132 0.164 0.139 0.158 0.137 0.174
[0.189] [0.021]*** [0.195] [0.021]*** [0.187] [0.021]*** [0.200]
EPL·Dec·lnSales (β6) − 0.077 − 0.036 0.102 − 0.039 0.066 − 0.036 0.058
[0.108] [0.020]* [0.106] [0.021]* [0.108] [0.021]* [0.117]
CommonLaw·Dec·lnSales (β7) ? 0.390 0.016 0.300 0.013 0.427 0.011 0.298
[0.233]* [0.036] [0.248] [0.036] [0.286] [0.036] [0.245]
Growth·Dec·lnSales (β8) − 0.020 0.007 0.019 0.008 0.029 0.008 0.011
[0.016] [0.003]** [0.016] [0.003]** [0.016]* [0.003]** [0.016]
StratInd·Dec·lnSales (β9) − − 0.201 − 0.166
[0.120]* [0.030]***
ElecYear·Dec·lnSales (β10) − − 0.301 − 0.019
[0.134]** [0.018]
LeftWing·Dec·lnSales (β11) − − 0.349 0.024
[0.130]*** [0.018]
PrePriv1·Dec·lnSales (β12) + 0.340
[0.199]*
PrivYear·Dec·lnSales (β13) ? 0.219
[0.161]
PostPriv·Dec·lnSales (β14) ? − 0.181
[0.127]
AsInt 0.008 − 0.000 0.007 − 0.000 0.007 − 0.000 0.007
[0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]***
SucDec − 0.001 − 0.018 0.001 − 0.018 0.001 − 0.018 0.002
[0.018] [0.002]*** [0.018] [0.002]*** [0.018] [0.002]*** [0.019]












Test of H2a Test of H2b Test of H2c Test of H2d
Predicted Sign SOEs Private firms SOEs Private firms SOEs Private firms SOEs
[0.007]** [0.002] [0.007]** [0.002] [0.007]** [0.002] [0.007]*
CommonLaw 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.008
[0.026] [0.003]** [0.026] [0.003]** [0.027] [0.003]** [0.026]
Growth 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.006
[0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]***
StratInd − 0.067 − 0.000
[0.016]* [0.011]
ElecYear − 0.015 − 0.003
[0.007]** [0.001]*










Chow Test 0.65 11.23*** 15.95***
R2 0.29 0.44 0.29 0.44 0.30 0.44 0.29
N 1208 39,210 1208 39,210 1208 39,210 1208
Notes: The table presents the results of the regression analyses to investigate the effects of socio-political variables on labor cost stickiness of SOEs and private firms. The dependent
variable is lnLaborCost (change of the natural logarithmic value of labor costs). The results for SOEs (private firms) are presented in columns 1, 3, and 5 (2, 4, and 6). The variables
of interest are StratInd (columns 1 and 2), ElecYear (columns 3 and 4), and LeftWing (columns 5 and 6). Column 7 displays the results of the regression analysis to investigate the
effect of privatization on the labor cost stickiness. The Chow Test row represents the difference between SOEs and private firms. Figures in brackets are standard errors, clustered at
the firm level. The effects of socio-political factors on cost stickiness (hypotheses 2a–2d) are in bold figures. See the appendix for variable definitions.
*Significance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
**Significance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
***Significance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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To test the robustness of our H1 findings, we need to demonstrate first that SOEs have stick-
ier labor costs than politically connected firms, and second that politically connected firms do
not exhibit higher labor cost stickiness than non-politically connected firms. Therefore, we run
two regressions, such that we compare politically connected private firms with non-politically
connected private firms in the first equation and then compare SOEs with politically connected
private firms in the second equation. To identify political connections, we turn to Faccio’s
(2006) database. Although these data mostly refer to the year 2001, we assume, consistent with
prior research (Faccio, 2006; Richter, 2010), that political connections persist unless dramatic
or sudden political changes occur.10 A dummy variable (PolCon) equals 1 if the private firm
is politically connected and 0 otherwise. When we run the basic regression equation for only
private firms, the politically connected firms exhibit less cost stickiness than non-politically con-
nected ones (β16 = 0.106, t = 2.12; see column 1 in Table 5). Compared with non-politically
connected firms, politically connected firms reduce their labor costs more when sales decline. As
a possible explanation for this finding, we posit that it may be easier for politically connected
firms to reduce their labor costs, because they can rely on their political connections to address
or overcome resistance from labor unions and other stakeholders. Next, when we include SOEs
and politically connected private firms in our sample, we find that SOEs still exhibit greater labor
cost stickiness, as indicated by the negative value of β3 in column 2 of Table 5 (β3 = − 0.237,
t = 2.64). Therefore, SOEs appear to experience stronger socio-political pressure to make asym-
metric labor cost adjustment decisions than do politically connected private firms, which leads
to the greater labor cost stickiness of SOEs.
4.4. Robustness Checks
We conduct several robustness checks. First, differences between SOEs and private firms may
increase a possible bias in the estimates, due to the potentially misspecified relation between the
dependent and independent variables (Shipman, Swanquist, & Whited, 2017). We therefore use
propensity score matching (PSM) to match SOEs with comparable private firms by selecting the
private firms that are most similar to SOEs, according to the distribution of observed covariates
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). We modify Borisova et al.’s (2012) approach and use size, sales
growth, return on assets, leverage, stock value traded as a percentage of GDP, and industry to
match the SOEs with private firm observations. A nearest-neighbor matching approach with a
caliper constraint ( ≤ .001) produces the matched pairs (Erkens & Bonner, 2013); we use one-to-
one matching without replacement. The PSM produces 1163 matched pairs, and a t-test indicates
that this PSM is reasonably successful in matching SOE firms with private firms, because the
pertinent covariates do not differ significantly across the two groups, except for size and industry.
We rerun the regression Equation (1) on our PSM observations. The results in column 1, Table 6,
are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3, column 3.
Second, SOEs are much larger than private firms on average, so firm size might explain the
SOEs’ cost behavior. To control for this effect, we use the natural logarithm of the lagged num-
ber of employees and interact it with Dec·ΔlnSales. Third, cost behavior tends to change during
economic crises (Banker, Fang, & Mehta, 2012). Therefore, we rerun the regression up to the
year 2007 (before the most recent economic crisis). Fourth, when managing SOEs, states tend
to consider their budget conditions (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2013). For example, politicians may
reduce their socio-political intervention and focus on monitoring SOEs more conscientiously if
budget pressures are high, leading to less cost stickiness. To measure the effect of states’ budget
conditions, we use BudDef (countries’ budget deficit) data from the World Bank. Fifth, instead
10A regression with observations for 2001 only produced results similar to those reported in the main text.
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Table 5. Results of regression analyses, controlling for political connections.
Dependent variable: lnLaborCost
(1) (2)








lnSales (β1) + 0.671 0.640
[0.010]*** [0.037]***
Dec·lnSales (β2) − − 0.278 − 0.154
[0.021]*** [0.104]
SOE·Dec·lnSales (β3) − − 0.237
[0.090]***
AsInt·Dec·lnSales (β4) − − 0.002 − 0.013
[0.001]* [0.028]
SucDec·lnSales (β5) + 0.138 0.095
[0.021]*** [0.098]
EPL·Dec·lnSales (β6) − − 0.040 0.063
[0.021]* [0.090]
CommonLaw·Dec·lnSales (β7) ? 0.011 0.226
[0.036] [0.185]








AsInt − 0.000 − 0.001
[0.000]*** [0.002]












Notes: This table presents the results of the regression analyses that compare politically connected firms with non-
politically connected private firms and SOEs. The dependent variable is lnLaborCost (change of the natural logarithmic
value of number of employees). Using private firm observations only, in column 1, we compare politically connected
firms and non-politically connected firms. Column 2 shows the results of comparing SOEs and politically connected
private firms. Figures in brackets are standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The effects of political connection and
state ownership on cost stickiness are in bold figures. See the appendix for variable definitions.
*Significance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
**Significance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
***Significance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
of investigating labor cost behavior, we use the change in the natural logarithmic value of the
number of employees as our dependent variable (Dierynck et al., 2012). Sixth, U.K. firms consti-
tute 31.82% of the total number of observations, but they provide only 14 firm-year observations





Table 6. Robustness checks.
Dependent variable: lnLaborCost (except column 5: lnLabor)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Predicted










lnSales (β1) + 0.599 0.676 0.705 0.669 0.611 0.644 0.672 0.669 0.752/0.419
[0.038]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.015]*** [0.012]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010***/0.016***]
Dec·lnSales (β2) − − 0.137 − 0.262 − 0.280 − 0.284 − 0.248 − 0.230 − 0.273 − 0.225 − 0.358/0.113
[0.084] [0.020]*** [0.024]*** [0.021]*** [0.031]*** [0.022]*** [0.021]*** [0.024]*** [0.023***/0.029***]
SOE·Dec·lnSales
(β3)
− − 0.207 − 0.306 − 0.152 − 0.157 − 0.305 − 0.176 − 0.181 − 0.148 − 0.148/ − 0.207
[0.077]*** [0.057]*** [0.071]** [0.057]*** [0.132]** [0.057]*** [0.058]*** [0.056]*** [0.73**/0.079**]
AsInt·Dec·lnSales
(β4)
− − 0.012 − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.003 − 0.001 − 0.003 − 0.002 − 0.001/ − 0.036
[0.016] [0.001] [0.001]* [0.001]* [0.002] [0.001]* [0.002] [0.001]* [0.001*/0.008***]
SucDec·Dec·lnSales
(β5)
+ 0.046 0.163 0.159 0.137 0.187 0.163 0.144 0.134
[0.102] [0.020]*** [0.027]*** [0.021]*** [0.032]*** [0.024]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]***
EPL·Dec·lnSales
(β6)
− 0.068 − 0.034 − 0.066 − 0.020 − 0.033 − 0.033 − 0.040 − 0.038 − 0.027/ − 0.030
[0.077] [0.020]* [0.026]** [0.022] [0.031] [0.020] [0.021]* [0.020]* [0.026/0.024]
CommonLaw·Dec·
lnSales (β7)
? 0.351 0.023 − 0.015 0.052 0.008 − 0.006 0.011 0.014 0.007/0.037
[0.173]** [0.035] [0.046] [0.040] [0.050] [0.089] [0.037] [0.036] [0.046/0.043]
Growth·Dec·
lnSales (β8)
− 0.018 0.007 − 0.017 0.004 0.012 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.003/0.012













SOE − 0.020 − 0.024 − 0.015 − 0.018 − 0.021 − 0.016 − 0.020 − 0.022 − 0.019











Dependent variable: lnLaborCost (except column 5: lnLabor)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Predicted










AsInt 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000
[0.002] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]* [0.000]*** [0.000]** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
SucDec − 0.010 − 0.014 − 0.017 − 0.018 − 0.010 − 0.009 − 0.017 − 0.017 − 0.017
[0.010] [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
EPL 0.013 0.000 − 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.001 − 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.006]** [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
CommonLaw 0.025 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.009 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.006
[0.012]** [0.003]** [0.003] [0.003]*** [0.004]** [0.007] [0.003]** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Growth 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003












Included (only for column 8)
R2 0.39 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.18 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.44
N 2,326 39,716 27,951 40,143 39,500 27,559 39,716 40,418 40,418
Notes: This table presents the results of various robustness tests. The dependent variable is lnLaborCost (change of the natural logarithmic value of labor costs), except in column
5, where the dependent variable is lnEmployee (change of the natural logarithmic value of number of employees). Column 1 presents the regression equation results after matching
SOE observations with private firms using PSM. Columns 2, 4, and 7 show the results after taking the effects of firm size, country’s budget deficit, and firms’ lagged labor cost per
employee, respectively. Column 3 displays the results of the regression using firm-year observations up to year 2007. In column 6 the sample excludes U.K. observations. In column
8, we interact the industry dummies with Dec·lnSales. In column 9, we follow Banker et al. (2014) and develop two dummy variables based on prior-period sales changes: increase
and decrease (PriorInc and PriorDec). We then develop four-way interactions between our variables and PriorInc or PriorDec. When there are two figures in the same cells, the first
figure refers to the PriorInc result, and the latter figure refers to the PriorDec result. Figures in brackets are standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The degree of cost stickiness of
SOEs is in bold figures. See the Appendix for definitions of all other variables.
*Significance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
**Significance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
***Significance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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the regression without U.K. firms. Seventh, SOEs tend to operate in strategic industries that
require more skilled labor, implying greater cost stickiness (Banker, Byzalov, & Chen, 2013).
To control for this factor, we use the lagged labor costs per employee as a proxy for employee
skills and interact it with Dec·ΔlnSales. Eighth, though we included industry dummies in our
specification to control for industry effects, as a further control for the industry effects on labor
cost stickiness, we interact the industry dummies with Dec·lnSales.11 Ninth, Banker, Byzalov,
Ciftci, and Mashruwala (2014) suggest that cost behavior in the current period is conditional on
the direction of prior-period sales changes, because managers use these changes as references to
predict future sales changes and make their resource adjustment decisions accordingly. We use
a two-period formula from Banker et al. (2014) to disentangle the effect of prior-period sales
changes on cost stickiness. As Table 6 shows, the results of these additional tests consistently
indicate that SOEs exhibit more asymmetric cost behavior than do private firms.12
Strong governance helps minimize managerial opportunistic behavior (Chen et al., 2012) or
governments’ socio-political intervention (Ben-Nasr et al., 2012). Therefore, SOEs in countries
with stronger governance might exhibit less labor cost stickiness than SOEs in countries with
weaker corporate governance. To test these arguments empirically, we divide our sample into
two groups, based on the median value of three governance-related variables: investor protection
(InvProt), the percentage of institutional ownership (InstOwn), and government effectiveness
(GoftEff ) (Banker et al., 2013b; Bertay, Demirguc-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2015; Chen et al., 2012).13
As Table 7 shows, in all the below-median subsamples (columns 1, 3, and 5), SOEs exhibit sig-
nificantly greater cost stickiness than private firms. In the above-median subsamples (columns
2, 4, and 6), SOEs exhibit significantly greater cost stickiness than private firms only in col-
umn 6 (InstOwn variable). The Chow test indicates that the coefficient of the SOE·Dec·lnSales
term for the above-median GovtEff subsample is significantly less negative than that for the
below-median subsample, and there is no difference between the SOE·Dec·lnSales of the
above- and below-median InvProt and InstOwn subsamples. Thus, the results cannot unequivo-
cally support the idea that strong corporate governance mechanisms are effective for mitigating
managerial opportunistic behavior or governments’ tendency to intervene in SOEs to attain their
socio-political interests.
4.5. Supplemental Analysis
Although labor costs arguably are more subject to managerial discretion and socio-political inter-
vention than more aggregated cost categories (Dierynck et al., 2012; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1994), selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) and operating costs are more com-
mon in cost stickiness literature (Anderson et al., 2003; Banker et al., 2013a; Calleja et al., 2006;
Chen et al., 2012). Therefore, we investigate whether the significant effect of state ownership
on cost stickiness also applies to SG&A and operating costs. In our overall sample, labor costs
constitute a small portion of total operating costs (ratio = 0.277) but they are higher than SG&A
costs (ratio = 1.763). In this sense, labor cost behavior may not be closely related to behaviors
11We use the Fama-French 5-industry classification for this robustness test to avoid multicollinearity concerns.
12As additional tests, we define a firm-year observation as an SOE if the state holds at least 5%, 10%, or 20% ownership.
Using these more restrictive definitions of SOEs did not alter our results.
13Consistent with Banker, Byzalov, and Threinen (2013) we use the composite anti-self-dealing index developed by
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanez, and Shleifer (2008). We must exclude firms from Estonia and Slovenia, because
these countries are not represented in the anti-self-dealing index database. Meanwhile, we construct the variable InstOwn
by deducting CloselyHeldShare% (percentage of shares held by all insiders; obtained from Datastream) from the per-
centage of government ownership for SOEs. In line with Bertay et al. (2015), we use a measure of government
effectiveness from Worldwide Governance Indicators to represent GoftEff (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2014). Because InvProt









Table 7. Robustness check after splitting the sample at median values of the governance variables.
Dependent variable: lnLaborCost
InvProt GovtEff InstOwn
Independent variables Predicted sign (1) Low (2) High (3) Low (4) High (5) Low (6) High
lnSales (β1) + 0.646 0.687 0.630 0.697 0.705 0.644
[0.014]*** [0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.015]***
Dec·lnSales (β2) − − 0.263 − 0.293 − 0.314 − 0.257 − 0.276 − 0.242
[0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.031]*** [0.027]*** [0.027]*** [0.025]***
SOE·Dec·lnSales (β3) − − 0.170 − 0.161 − 0.185 − 0.115 − 0.293 − 0.367
[0.064]*** [0.106] [0.071]*** [0.082] [0.082]*** [0.129]***
AsInt·Dec·lnSales (β4) − − 0.019 − 0.002 − 0.023 − 0.002 − 0.059 − 0.002
[0.010]* [0.001]* [0.009]*** [0.001]* [0.013]*** [0.001]**
SucDec·lnSales (β5) + 0.156 0.118 0.151 0.128 0.126 0.135
[0.028]*** [0.030]*** [0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.032]*** [0.031]***
EPL·Dec·lnSales (β6) − − 0.001 − 0.054 0.075 0.002 − 0.027 − 0.036
[0.022] [0.019]*** [0.027]*** [0.024] [0.018] [0.018]**
Growth·Dec· lnSales (β8) − 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.005
[0.004]** [0.005]* [0.004]** [0.004] [0.004]** [0.005]
SOE − 0.014 − 0.026 − 0.012 − 0.027 − 0.020 − 0.022
[0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]*** [0.010]**
AsInt − 0.002 − 0.000 − 0.002 − 0.000 0.000 − 0.000
[0.001]* [0.000]*** [0.001]** [0.000]*** [0.000] [0.000]***
SucDec − 0.012 − 0.024 − 0.012 − 0.022 − 0.019 − 0.018
[0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***
EPL 0.004 − 0.006 0.009 − 0.003 − 0.005 0.000
[0.002]** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]* [0.001]*** [0.001]
Growth 0.004 0.001 0.005 − 0.001 0.001 0.003
[0.001]*** [0.001] [0.001]*** [0.001] [0.001]* [0.001]***
Industry Dummies Included
Year Dummies Included
Chow Test 0.69 4.74** 0.74
R2 0.41 0.46 0.40 0.47 0.49 0.42
N 20,750 19,668 19,529 20,889 16,318 16,303
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression analyses after splitting the sample into two subsamples based on the median value of the three governance variables (InvProt,
GovtEff, and InstOwn). The dependent variable is lnLaborCost (change of the natural logarithmic value of labor costs). The results for the below-median (above-median) subsamples
are presented at columns 1, 3, and 5 (2, 4, and 6). Figures in brackets are standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The degree of cost stickiness of SOEs is in bold figures. See the
appendix for variable definitions.
*Significance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
**Significance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
***Significance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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Table 8. Supplemental analyses using different cost categories.
Dep. Var: lnSG&A Dep. Var: lnOprCosts
Independent variables Predicted Sign (1) (2)
lnSales (β1) + 0.661 0.886
[0.016]*** [0.006]***
Dec·lnSales (β2) − − 0.127 − 0.080
[0.042]*** [0.013]***
SOE·Dec·lnSales (β3) − 0.080 0.034
[0.100] [0.037]
AsInt·Dec·lnSales (β5) − − 0.004 − 0.006
[0.002]** [0.002]**
SucDec·Dec·lnSales (β4) + 0.039 0.043
[0.040] [0.014]***
EPL·Dec·lnSales (β6) − − 0.033 − 0.042
[0.042] [0.014]***
CommonLaw·Dec·lnSales (β7) ? − 0.064 − 0.071
[0.066] [0.024]***




AsInt − 0.000 − 0.000
[0.000]*** [0.000]*












Notes: This table presents the regression analyses using the logarithmic value of the change in different cost categories
(SG&A and operating costs). The dependent variable is lnSG&A and lnOprCost (change of the natural logarithmic
value of SG&A and operating costs, respectively). Figures in brackets are standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The
degree of cost stickiness of SOEs is in bold figures. See the Appendix for variable definitions.
*Significance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
**Significance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
***Significance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
associated with operating or SG&A costs. We mimic the steps delineated for the final firm-year
sample, except that we use alternative cost criteria for this analysis and do not delete observations
with SG&A (operating costs) > sales.
As Table 8 shows, the sample firms exhibit cost stickiness for either of the alternative cost
categories (Dec·lnSales is significantly negative); however, the results indicate that SOE does
not have a significant effect on cost stickiness for the alternative cost categories as none of the
SOE·Dec·lnSales coefficients is negative. These analyses thus reveal that state ownership does
not cause cost stickiness in more aggregated cost categories. Rather, SOEs may exhibit cost
stickiness only in categories that are directly susceptible to socio-political influence (Shleifer,
1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Because only the labor costs of SOEs exhibit greater cost stick-
iness, these results further suggest that omitted technological or economic factors are unlikely to
explain differences between SOEs and private firms.
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5. Conclusions
With a sample of firms from 22 European countries during 1993–2012, we investigate the role
of state ownership in explaining asymmetric cost behavior. Consistent with our predictions, we
find that SOEs exhibit greater cost stickiness than private firms, which is due to stronger socio-
political influences over the SOEs. The results demonstrate that the effects of election years
and left-wing governments on labor cost stickiness is stronger in SOEs than in private firms.
Moreover, in the year prior to privatization, labor cost stickiness decreases, possibly due to pre-
privatization labor restructuring. Our results are also robust to various sensitivity analyses.
Different owners have different incentives with regard to managing costs (Grossman & Hart,
1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Shleifer, 1998) and recent literature suggests that ownership type
affects firms’ cost behavior (Hall, 2016; Holzhacker et al., 2015). We contribute to this stream of
literature by showing that a particular ownership type (i.e. state ownership) has significant effects
on asymmetric cost behavior. Our cross-country setting also reveals the role of socio-political
variables for explaining SOEs’ labor cost stickiness; these variables help detail the differences
in labor cost stickiness between SOEs and private firms. Our findings thus contribute to an
expanded understanding of the effects of state ownership on firm performance and other out-
come variables. State ownership of profit-seeking firms remains important (Christiansen, 2011),
and understanding the impact on labor cost stickiness represents a means to advance the ongoing
debate about whether state ownership is beneficial to SOE performance in general. Our research
contributes to this debate by illuminating the role of state ownership and socio-political factors
in resource adjustment decisions and the cost behavior that ensues from these decisions.
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Appendix
Variable Definitions and Sources
Variables Definition Sources
lnLaborCost The change of the natural logarithmic value
of labor costs (ln LaborCostsi,t − ln
LaborCosti,t−1)
Datastream
lnSales The change of the natural logarithmic value of
labor costs (ln Salesi,t − ln Salesi,t−1)
Datastream
Dec A dummy variable equal to 1 if
Salesi,t < Salesi,t − 1, and 0 otherwise
(deflated figures)
Datastream
SOE A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state has a





AsInt Total assets divided by net sales Datastream
SucDec A dummy variable equal to 1 if
Salesi,t < Salesi,t − 1 < Salesi,t − 2, and
0 otherwise (deflated figures)
Datastream
EPL Unweighted average of OECD measures of
strictness of labor regulation regarding
employee dismissal, categorized into three
types: individual dismissal of regular workers,
temporary workers, and collective dismissal.
Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development
(2013)
CommonLaw A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s
domicile country has common-law legal origin
(UK and Ireland), and 0 otherwise
La Porta et al. (1998)
Growth Annual percentage of GDP change at market
prices based on current local currency
The World Bank (2013)
StratInd A dummy variable equal to 1 if the SOE’s main
activities are in mining, oil, steel, transporta-
tion, utilities, defense and telecommunication
and 0 otherwise.
Fama and French (2016),
Boubakri et al. (2009)
ElecYear A dummy variable equal to 1 if the reporting year
is country’s election year, 0 otherwise




LeftWing A dummy variable equal to 1 if the ruling
government in the year is a left-wing one, and
0 otherwise
World Bank Database of Political
Institutions
PrePriv1 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the SOE
observation is made one year before an SOE




PrivYear A dummy variable equal to 1 if the SOE is




PostPriv A dummy variable equal to 1 if the SOE
observation is made after an SOE privatization
and 0 otherwise
Privatization Barometer, firms’
annual reports, financial
statements, or websites
